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Tufts Medical Center, Boston, MA, USAA B S T R A C TBackground: Section 114 of the Food and Drug Administration Mod-
ernization Act of 1997 regulates the promotion of health economic
information by pharmaceutical companies to US health plans. Greater
clarity is important given demands by payers and other stakeholders
for evidence of value. Objectives: To develop hypothetical case
studies of health economic promotions to examine legal and policy
implications. Methods: We constructed for pedagogical purposes 10
categories of potential health economic promotions. We generated
hypothetical case studies for each category, including questions about
whether each might be allowable under Section 114. The case studies
were developed around the following categories: 1) costing out on-label
clinical end points; 2) promotion of a costing exercise to physicians
working in an accountable care organization setting; 3) burden-of-illness
claims; 4) economic analysis of a formulary restriction policy; 5) extrap-
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randomized clinical trials; 8) costing out a competitor drug’s adverse
event; 9) economic analysis of comparative effectiveness claims using an
indirect treatment comparison; and 10) extrapolating from surrogate to
long-term outcomes in an economic model. Discussion: Most cases
seem to fall into a gray zone given haziness around what constitutes
“competent and reliable evidence” and “directly relate[d]” to an approved
indication. In practice, it is difﬁcult to knowwhat the section allows given
the imprecision of the statute and lack of guidance about its scope.
Conclusion: Ideally, future guidance will provide clarity and ﬂexibility.
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Section 114 of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997 stipulated the circumstances under which pharmaceutical
companies can proactively promote health economic information
to health plans. The idea was to permit ﬂexibility so that companies
could engage health plans to inform coverage and reimbursement.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), however, has never
released guidance or issued regulatory action on this topic. Clarity
is important given the growing interest by payers and pharmaceut-
ical companies in measuring interventions’ value using real-world
databases and comparative effectiveness research [1].
The section contains four key provisions (Table 1). First, the law
applies only to “health care economic,” not clinical, information.
Second, a promotion must target a “formulary committee or other
similar entity.” Third, support for the claim must comprise “com-
petent and reliable scientiﬁc evidence” (CRSE), rather than “sub-
stantial evidence,” the standard governing clinical promotional
claims to general prescribers [2]. CRSE suggests a more ﬂexible
criterion than the substantial evidence standard for clinical claims,
which generally means two adequate and well-controlled clinical
trials. However, CRSE should not be seen as a path to compromisescientiﬁc integrity. Rather, the competent and reliable standard
refers to a set of best practices criteria that support that health
economic information intended for promotional purposes. Such
practices would presumably include that studies should conform
to proper methodological practices [3–7]; have prespeciﬁed end
points, a scientiﬁcally sound research design and analysis plan,
and a strong statistical foundation—for example, sufﬁcient
attempts to control for bias; and rule out potential confounders.
Sensitivity analyses should be carried out, results should be
appropriately generalizable, and analyses should be conducted
as prespeciﬁed, without inspection of comparative outcomes.
Importantly, studies must still adhere to FDA’s criteria for “fair
balance,” meaning that associated advantages and risks must be
communicated via reasonably similar substance and format.
Fourth, promotions must “directly relate[d]” to an approved
drug indication. The directly-related provision is important in
signaling that Section 114 was not intended as a path to “off-
label” promotion. What is meant by “directly relate,” however, is
not entirely clear. Virtually all health economic analyses rest on a
clinical foundation and frequently include implied or explicit
assumptions about a product’s risks and beneﬁts in certain
populations and over certain time periods. A House Committeeociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
ion of Value and Risk in Health, Institute for Clinical Research and
f Medicine, 800 Washington Street, Box 63, Boston, MA 02111.
Table 1 – Key issues in FDAMA Section 114.
Key issue Description
Health care economic
information
Claims must pertain to the health
care economic information
associated with using a particular
drug (not clinical efﬁcacy)
Audience Claims must be directed to a
formulary committee or similar
(presumably population-level
decision makers), not to providers,
consumers, or patients
Competent and reliable
scientiﬁc evidence
Claims must meet this standard of
evidence, presumably by meeting
the standards of experts in the ﬁeld,
rather than the stricter “substantial
evidence” standard for clinical
claims (generally two adequate and
well-controlled trials)
Directly related to the
approved indication
Claims must be directly related to an
indication for which the drug has
been approved by the FDA
FDA, Food and Drug Administration; FDAMA, Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997.
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provides some guidance—for example, it notes that in the case of
rheumatoid arthritis drugs “approved for the treatment of symp-
toms and not for the prevention of deformity,” promotions
related to the latter would not be considered “directly relate[d]”
[8]. Any public statements from FDA ofﬁcials about Section 114,
however, have been rare and those made, though they represent
the views of the individual making them and not necessarily the
FDA, seem to suggest a high evidence bar for Section 114—for
example, by suggesting that comparative claims generally require
substantial evidence from a head-to-head comparison [9].
Relatively little has been written about Section 114. According to
the authorizing statute, the Government Accountability Ofﬁce was
supposed to have conducted a study by 2002, but it never did.
Although drug companies have promoted claims about costs and
value in print advertisements [10], the extent to which companies
are using Section 114 is not clear. No one really knows the extent to
which companies use Section 114, because the FDA does not publish
any information about who has contacted it on Section 114
initiatives. Moreover, to our knowledge, FDA has never taken any
action in the form of a warning letter or notice of violation against a
company that speciﬁcally mentions a violation of the Section 114
statute [11]. Two surveys of outcomes research leaders in pharma-
ceutical companies suggested that drug ﬁrms are using Section 114
to some extent, but that companies are cautious and want more
clarity from the FDA, particularly about how to deﬁne CRSE [2,12].
Observers have suggested several potential reasons for the lack of
attention to Section 114, including that the section provides limited
maneuverability owing to the restrictiveness of the provisions, that
the lack of FDA guidance and uncertainty about where the “line” is
have made companies wary of using the section, and that unsoli-
cited requests by health plans for information about value through
the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy Format has co-opted the
section [13]. Other reasons companies may not want to use Section
114 may include their lack of expertise or experience in the area, the
time and risks involved, and, possibly, that they are successful with
other marketing strategies and do not see the need. Companies may
also be cautious about using Section 114 because of concern that if
they reveal drug prices in a pharmacoeconomic analysis, it may
constrain their ability to change them later.To illuminate situations in which Section 114 may apply, we
developed 10 hypothetical case studies. To our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst effort to develop such examples and explore the potential
legal and policy implications. Our intention is to advance under-
standing around Section 114 and to stimulate debate on regulatory
and legislative responses. The intended audience consists of 1)
individuals within pharmaceutical companies who develop evi-
dence and consider promotional materials containing health
economic information and 2) the FDA and legislators, who must
interpret the appropriate boundaries of Section 114. The article
also has implications for payers and formulary committee mem-
bers, who are the recipients of Section 114 promotions.Methods
Constructing Categories of Health Economic Promotions
On the basis of our experiences interacting with pharmaceutical
companies on issues surrounding Section 114, we developed the
following examples: Costing out on-label clinical end points
 Promotion of costing exercise to physicians working in
accountable care organization (ACO) settings
 Burden-of-illness claims
 Economic analysis of a formulary restriction policy
 Extrapolations to doses, populations, or settings not covered
in trials, but reﬂecting how drugs are used in the real world
 Adherence claims
 “Utilization of care” as a secondary end point in randomized
clinical trials
 Costing out a competitor drug’s adverse event
 Economic analysis of comparative effectiveness claims using
an indirect treatment comparison
 Extrapolating from surrogate to long-term outcomes in an
economic model
The 10 examples are listed roughly in order of proximity to the
drug’s labeled clinical claim; that is, earlier examples contain
promotions closer to labeled claims. In constructing the catego-
ries, we sought to cover a range of issues based on study designs,
databases, and end points.
Developing Case Studies
We generated hypothetical case studies for each category. For each
case, we highlight key issues (Table 2) and also present the cases in
terms of their distance from the labeled clinical indication (Fig. 1).
All cases are hypothetical and by necessity oversimpliﬁed. They
were developed for pedagogical purposes. We emphasize that in
reality, submission to the FDA using Section 114 submissions may
be part of a larger and more complex exercise that includes
considerations of efﬁcacy, safety, effectiveness, coherence with
the label, highlights of ﬁndings, methods, means, interpretations,
and plans for promotional use. In this article, we have focused only
on the health economic claim. However, we attempted to make
these claims as relevant as possible to real-world situations. We
also attempted to cover a range of diseases (e.g., chronic vs. acute)
and situations (e.g., use of databases and indirect treatment
comparisons). To check the plausibility and verisimilitude of the
cases, we shared an early draft of the article with both the National
Pharmaceutical Council, who provided support for this research,
and the Ofﬁce of Prescription Drug Promotion at the FDA. With our
agreement, the National Pharmaceutical Council, in turn, shared
the draft with its member companies for review, and we received
comments from seven companies. We did not receive feedback
from the FDA other than an acknowledgment that it had received
Table 2 – Case studies.
Category Promotional claim Key issues
1. Costing out on-label clinical end
points
A Medicare advantage plan of 1 million enro-
llees would save roughly $3 million over a 1-y
period because of reduced hip and vertebral
compression fractures in its population.
 Is Section 114 even needed?
2. Promotion of costing exercise to
physicians working in ACO settings
The ACO would save $1.5 million over a 1-y
period because of reduced hip and
vertebral compression fractures in its
population due to drug A.
 Is the physician an acceptable audience
covered under the “formulary committee or
other similar entity” provision?
3. Burden-of-illness claims RRMS is an expensive disease, costing
roughly $30,000 per patient per year above
the cost of care for matched controls.
 Does the burden-of-illness claim fall under
Section 114?
 Do burden-of-illness claims imply clinical claims?
 What if, as is inevitable, the patients in the
database on which the study is based differ
from those in the trial (e.g., they have
different RRMS symptoms)?
4. Economic analysis of a formulary
restriction policy
Formulary access restrictions on biologic C
increase overall health costs.
 Does the promotion adhere to the “related to
an indication approved” provision?
 Does the methodology adhere to the CRSE
standard?
5. Extrapolations to doses, populations,
or settings not covered in trials, but
reﬂecting how drugs are used in the
real world
Use of drug E saves $500,000 for a health plan
over a 1-y period.
 Is an implied claim of effectiveness being
made about populations unlike those in
the RCT?
6. Adherence claims In a health plan database, in patients with
Parkinson’s disease, drug F is associated
with higher rates of adherence than drug G
over a 1-y period.
 Are adherence claims covered under
Section 114?
 Does the promotion make unsubstantiated
implied clinical claims?
7. “Utilization of care” as a secondary
end point in RCTs
A retrospective database study showed that
in patients with certain hospital-acquired
infections, drug H reduces hospital length
of stay and would save a midsize hospital
$400,000 per year.
 Is length of stay covered under Section 114?
 Is there an implied clinical claim of
superiority?
8. Costing out a competitor drug’s
adverse event
In a retrospective database study, drug J
reduces costs of hospitalizations due to
infection by $500 per patient over 1 y
relative to drug K.
 Is there an implied clinical claim of
superiority?
 To what extent is it problematic that the trial
was not and could not be powered to
examine adverse events?
9. Economic analysis of comparative
effectiveness claims using an indirect
treatment comparison
An indirect treatment comparison suggests
that drug L reduces the cost of health care
related to asthma in children aged 2 to 16 y
relative to drug M.
 Does the promotion go beyond health
economic data because of the implied clinical
claim of superiority from the indirect
treatment comparison?
 Does the indirect treatment comparison meet
the CRSE standard?
10. Extrapolating from surrogate to
long-term outcomes in an economic
model
Drug N has an incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio of $10,000 per QALY gained vs.
standard of care in patients at risk for heart
disease; it is considered cost-effective by
traditional benchmarks.
 Would this claim violate the “directly-relate
[d]” clause if the epidemiological evidence
were very strong?
 Does the modeling approach
constitute CRSE?
ACO, accountable care organization; CRSE, competent and reliable scientiﬁc evidence; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year; RCT, randomized
controlled trial; RRMS, relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 6 8 2 – 6 8 9684and appreciated the article. All judgments and conclusions are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the
National Pharmaceutical Council or others.Case Studies
Case 1: Costing out on-Label Clinical End Points
Rationale: A company wishes to “cost out” clinical end points from
a randomized controlled trial (RCT).Scenario: Company 1 conducts an RCT on drug A, with hip and
vertebral compression fractures as primary end points. The drug
is approved with an indication to prevent these fractures in
postmenopausal women with osteoporosis. The company uses
published estimates on fracture costs to estimate potential
savings from using the drug, based on data on the drug’s effect
in the clinical trial, for a typical health plan serving Medicare
populations.
Promotional claim: A Medicare Advantage plan of 1 million
enrollees would save roughly $3 million over a 1-year period
See text for further explanation of numbered case studies.
ACO = accountable care organization
1. Cosng out on-label 
clinical endpoints
2. Promoon of cosng 
exercise to physicians in 
ACO sengs
10. Extrapolang from surrogate to 
long term outcomes in an economic 
model
3. Burden of illness claims
4. Economic analysis of a 
formulary restricon policy
5. Extrapolaons to other 
doses, populaons, or 
sengs
6. Adherence claims
7. “Ulizaon of care” as a secondary 
endpoint
8. Cosng out a competitor drug’s 
adverse event
9. Economic analysis of comparave 
eﬀecveness claims
Distance from label indicaonNear Far 
Fig. 1 – Case studies by distance from labeled clinical indication. See text for further explanation of numbered case studies.
ACO, accountable care organization.
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population owing to the use of drug A.
Key questions: Because the claim “costs out” clinical end points on the label,
is it limited to Section 114 promotions, or could companies
make this claim to general prescribers? Does the costing exercise comprise CRSE? What standards
would the cost estimates have to meet? Is it sufﬁcient to apply
estimates from one context to an “average” population?
Analysis: This type of promotion might be allowable under
Section 114 because it is a costing exercise pertaining to on-label
claims, though presumably the exercise would have to conform
to CRSE standards and perhaps the populations underlying the
cost estimates would have to be applicable to other settings.Case 2: Promotion of Costing Exercise to Physicians Working
in ACO Settings
Rationale: A pharmaceutical company wants to promote a claim
to a physician in an ACO, using the same exercise discussed
above in case 1.
Scenario: As in case 1, company 1 conducts an RCT on drug A,
with hip and vertebral compression fractures as primary end
points. The drug is approved to prevent these fractures in
postmenopausal women with osteoporosis. The company uses
published estimates on fracture costs to estimate savings for an
ACO with 500,000 patients. The company presents the analysis to
a physician working in the ACO who participates in the organ-
ization’s management.
Promotional claim: The ACO would save $1.5 million over a 1-
year period because of reduced hip and vertebral compression
fractures in its population owing to drug A.Key questions: Is the communication covered under the “for-
mulary committee or other similar entity” provision of
Section 114?
Analysis: Section 114 covers “formulary committee[s] or other
similar entit[ies],” and whether the clause covers ACOs is not
entirely clear. The phrase “similar entities” seems to imply
organizations making population-based decisions, and thus the
claim might be deemed allowable because it is presented to a
physician in a management position in the organization. One
might evoke a version of the “learned intermediary” legal doc-
trine, which holds that manufacturers of drugs fulﬁll their duty of
care when they provide necessary information to experts who
then interact with end users [14]. In this case, physicians working
on behalf of the formulary committee, health plan, or ACO would
be the learned intermediary, making an informed choice on
behalf of the general prescribers in the organization as well as
the patient populations served. Prescribers with no access
responsibilities for other prescribers would not fall under Section
114. The physician in question, however, would be expected to
serve in a management role and to have expertise to evaluate the
evidence underlying the Section 114 promotion. Moreover, the
company would be advised to approach the physician through
the ACO’s committee membership and staff.Case 3: Burden-of-Illness Claims
Rationale: A company wants to disseminate a burden-of-illness
study to health plans.
Scenario: Company 2 markets drug B, indicated for alleviating
tremor and fatigue, symptoms of relapsing-remitting multiple
sclerosis (RRMS). The drug is not indicated for other symptoms,
such as cognitive or visual impairment. The company analyzes a
health insurance claims database to calculate the annual health
care costs incurred by patients with RRMS compared with
matched controls. There is no information in the database about
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sclerosis and assumptions about the proportion of patients
with RRMS.
Promotional claim: RRMS is an expensive disease, costing
roughly $30,000 per patient per year above the cost of care for
matched controls.
Key questions: Is a promotional claim that does not include a drug covered
under Section 114? According to the statute, health care
economic information “identiﬁes, measures, or compares the
economic consequences, including the costs of the repre-
sented health outcomes, of the use of a drug to the use of
another drug, to another health care intervention, or to no
intervention.” Is there an implied clinical claim about drug B because it is
indicated for certain symptoms (tremor and fatigue), whereas
the burden was calculated using estimates of patients
assumed to have RRMS (who thus likely had other symptoms
as well)? Does the promotion potentially violate the “directly-related to
an indication approved” provision?
Analysis: As with other examples, the case seems to fall in a
gray area. This promotion might be permissible, because it does
not make overt clinical claims about the drug and simply
contains a cost-of-illness study. There could be questions, how-
ever, about whether a claim that does not include a drug falls
under Section 114. In addition, there may be questions about
whether there are implied clinical claims if the promotion
appears linked to a particular product, and about whether the
promotion is “directly relate[d]” to the approved indication
because patients in the database have symptoms unlike those
indicated for the drug. Also, the methodology would have to
adhere to CRSE standards.
Case 4: Economic Analysis of a Formulary Restriction Policy
Rationale: A company believes that a health plan’s formulary
restriction policy may increase overall health costs for affected
patients.
Scenario: Company 3 has biologic C, which is indicated for
reducing inﬂammation in rheumatoid arthritis. A health plan
adds a step edit restricting access to biologic C, such that patients
must ﬁrst have an inadequate response to a less expensive drug
D (approved for the same indication). The company hypothesizes
that the policy will increase overall health costs, even though it
may reduce pharmacy costs, because patients will be less well
managed on the cheaper alternative, and thus have more
physician visits and hospitalizations. The company conducts a
retrospective analysis using claims data. It analyzes patients with
at least one prescription of the drug and plan enrollment 1 year
before and after policy implementation.
Promotional claim: Formulary access restrictions on biologic C
increase overall health costs.
Key questions: Is there an implied clinical claim of superiority and thus a
violation of the “directly-related” clause? Does the methodology adhere to the CRSE standard? What
research design and statistical methods were used?
Analysis: This promotion might be allowable because it con-
tains an analysis of a formulary restriction and does not make
overt clinical claims. There may be concerns, however, about
implied clinical claims of superiority, and potentially concernsthat study populations may differ from those in the product label.
Moreover, the methods would have to adhere to CRSE standards.
Case 5: Extrapolations to Doses, Populations, or Settings Not
Covered in Trials, but Reﬂecting How Drugs Are Used in the
Real World
Rationale: A company wishes to present a budget impact model
(BIM) to a health plan.
Scenario: Company 4 has demonstrated in an RCT that drug E
(an antiarrhythmic drug) is associated with fewer hospitaliza-
tions due to atrial ﬁbrillation than a competitor in patients with a
history of persistent atrial ﬁbrillation. The company develops a
BIM to show a health plan’s savings over 1 year from reduced
hospitalizations.
Promotional claim: Use of drug E saves $500,000 for a health
plan over a 1-year period.
Key questions: Does use of the BIM violate the “directly-related”
clause of Section 114 because plan populations differ from those
in the product label?
Analysis: The promotion might be allowable because the
analysis assumes that the drug works in a similar way in the
plan population as it did in the RCT. Concerns could arise to the
extent that the populations differ—that is, in terms of demo-
graphic characteristics, disease severity, and treatment regimen
or if the trial is done on selected subgroups but the BIM general-
izes to broader populations—or if the analysis does not adhere to
CRSE standards.
Case 6: Adherence Claims
Rationale: A new drug has similar efﬁcacy to, and a higher price
than, a competitor, but because of its dosing may be associated
with higher adherence.
Scenario: Company 5 conducts an RCT that demonstrates that
drug F is effective in controlling symptoms of Parkinson’s
disease. Drug G is also indicated for Parkinson’s disease, but drug
F and drug G were not compared in a head-to-head trial.
Although they have similar efﬁcacy, the more expensive drug F
is dosed once a day versus three times per day for its competitor.
Suspecting that this difference is associated with better adher-
ence (and thus better outcomes and lower costs), the company
analyzes a claims database to examine adherence rates in
patients taking the drugs.
Promotional claim: In a health plan database, in patients with
Parkinson’s disease, drug F is associated with higher rates of
adherence than drug G over a 1-year period.
Key questions: Are adherence claims covered under Section 114?
 Does the promotion imply an unsubstantiated superiority
claim?
 What methods must be used to ensure that the analysis
complies with the CRSE criterion?
 If the company had calculated the cost differential associated
with improved adherence and only used those savings
estimates in the promotion, would it be allowed under Section
114?
Analysis: Whether the promotion would be allowed is unclear.
One might argue that the design is not adequate given the
potential for confounding. Moreover, adherence may not be
covered under health economic data and one could argue that
there are implied clinical claims of superiority of one drug over
another. Adherence, however, can reﬂect many factors—efﬁcacy,
safety, costs, convenience, and so forth—and it is challenging to
tease out determinants. Possibly, an “adherence” claim would be
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meets CRSE criteria (i.e., in this case a well-conducted database
study) and there is no overt clinical claim of superior efﬁcacy or
safety. Furthermore, one could argue that clinical superiority is not
implied, given that dosing differences in the case seem to underlie
the improved adherence. An important part of the analysis would
be ruling out any co-pay differences as a confounding factor.
Finally, the FDA will likely scrutinize promotional claims involving
head-to-head comparisons rigorously and perhaps more rigor-
ously than non–head-to-head claims, and thus, additional issues
about the claim in question might be raised.
Case 7: “Utilization of Care” as a Secondary End Point in RCTs
Rationale: A new drug has similar efﬁcacy to and a higher price
than a competitor, but may be associated with decreased hospital
length of stay (LOS) and lower costs.
Scenario: Drug H from company 6 is approved on the basis of a
noninferiority trial versus drug I in treating certain hospital-
acquired infections including methicillin-susceptible and
methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infections.
In the trial, drug H reduces the LOS (a secondary end point) by 0.4
days. Separately, the company analyzes a claims database to
examine the LOS in patients taking the two drugs and calculates
that drug H reduces the LOS by 0.6 days relative to drug I and
would save a midsize hospital $400,000 per year.
Promotional claim: A retrospective database study showed that in
patients with certain hospital-acquired infections, drug H reduces
hospital LOS and would save a midsize hospital $400,000 per year.
Key questions: Is LOS covered under Section 114?
 Is there an implied clinical claim of superiority? Does the fact
that the LOS was prespeciﬁed as a secondary end point help?
Would it matter if this result had been statistically signiﬁcant?
Does it matter if the LOS relates to the primary end point?
Analysis: Whether the promotion would be allowable is un-
clear. Although there are no overt clinical claims, one could argue
that there is an implied superiority claim. It is also unclear whether
LOS claims are covered under the section and whether a claim
based on this secondary end point would be allowable. The
concern about implied clinical claims might be considered weak
if other factors (dosing differences, hospital policies) are probable
causes of LOS differences and the claim may not meet CRSE
standards if those other factors are not accounted for in the
analysis.
Case 8: Costing out a Competitor Drug’s Adverse Event
Rationale: A new drug has efﬁcacy similar to that of a competitor,
but may have a better adverse events proﬁle that results in
lower costs.
Scenario: Company 7 conducts an RCT on drug J that demon-
strates superiority to standard of care in reducing inﬂammation
from rheumatoid arthritis. A separate trial studied drug K, in the
same therapeutic class, with a similar population and compara-
tor. Although there were no head-to-head trials, drug J had fewer
adverse events, including fewer infections due to hospitalization.
Company 7 analyzes patients on each drug in a claims database
and compares hospitalizations due to infections over 1 year. The
company calculates that patients taking drug J have fewer
hospitalizations due to infection and $500 less per patient in
hospitalization costs over the year.
Promotional claim: In a retrospective database study, drug J
reduces costs of hospitalizations due to infection by $500 per
patient over 1 year relative to drug K.Key questions: Does the cost comparison imply clinical superiority?
 Would use of the database raise any concerns because it
contains patients who differ from those in the trial?
Analysis: As in other examples, the promotion seems to fall in
a gray area. There are no overt clinical claims made and the drugs
in questions have similar indications and were studied on similar
populations and comparators. Because the database analysis
follows the drug’s approved indication, the use of the claims
data would presumably not raise concerns. Even if done accord-
ing to CRSE standards, however, the analysis may raise questions
about implied clinical claims of superiority given the absence of
direct comparisons in trials. As noted above, the FDA may view
the absence of head-to-head trials as a particular problem.
Case 9: Economic Analysis of Comparative Effectiveness
Claims Using an Indirect Treatment Comparison
Rationale: A company wants to promote the economic advantages
of its drug against a competitor. The two drugs, however, have
not been compared in head-to-head trials, so the company
conducts a comparative effectiveness study.
Scenario: Company 8 markets drug L, which has demonstrated
superiority to standard of care in reducing asthma inﬂammation
and symptoms in children aged 2 to 16 years. A competitor in the
same therapeutic class, drug M, is approved for the same indica-
tion against the same comparator. Company 8 conducts an
indirect treatment comparison using data from the separate
trials and ﬁnds that drug L reduces asthma attacks and decreases
symptom severity relative to drug M. The company calculates
associated costs using published estimates on acute asthma
exacerbation costs.
Promotional claim: An indirect treatment comparison suggests
that drug L reduces the cost of health care related to asthma in
children aged 2 to 16 years relative to drug M.
Key questions: Does the promotion lack adequate substantiation because of
the implied clinical claim of superiority from the indirect
treatment comparison? Does the indirect treatment comparison meet the CRSE
standard?
Analysis: Although the permissibility of the claim is subject to
some debate, presumably this type of promotion raises questions
because there are implied superiority claims without direct
comparisons in clinical trials or real-world databases. The indi-
rect treatment comparison would have to meet CRSE standards,
but even a well-done analysis that focuses on cost would not
completely remove concern about implied clinical claims without
head-to head RCTs.
Case 10: Extrapolating from Surrogate to Long-Term
Outcomes in an Economic Model
Rationale: A company develops an economic model to estimate
the long-term consequences of using its drug.
Scenario: Company 9 markets drug N, indicated to lower lipid
levels in individuals diagnosed with, or at risk for, heart disease.
The company develops a model to estimate the cost per quality-
adjusted life-year associated with drug N. Because no RCT has
examined the impact of drug N on cardiovascular events (myo-
cardial infarction, stroke, etc.) and mortality, the company uses
published risk equations based on well-established epidemiolog-
ical evidence demonstrating the association between lipid levels
and cardiovascular events and mortality. Cost information is
derived from a claims database and national data on event costs.
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estimates of health utilities for cardiac events and other relevant
health states.
Promotional claim: Drug N has an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of $10,000 per quality-adjusted life-year gained
versus standard of care in patients at risk for heart disease; it is
considered cost-effective by conventional benchmarks.
Key questions: Would a promotional claim based on this model violate the
“directly-relate[d]” clause? What if the epidemiological evi-
dence linking lipids and cardiac events were extremely robust
and the model contained a disclaimer that the company had
not studied the long-term end points in trials? What model development standards would meet the CRSE
standard?
Analysis: Whether the promotion of this model under Section
114 would be allowable is unclear, but the case raises questions
because it may violate the “directly-relate[d]” clause in extrapolat-
ing from intermediate to long-term end points not on the label. It
also uses information from databases that contain patients unlike
those studied in the clinical trial. Whether the model meets the
CRSE standard will presumably turn on factors such as trans-
parency of the assumptions, the appropriateness of the methods
and inputs, and the presence of sensitivity analysis (e.g., see the
report on modeling practices by ISPOR and SMDM) [15].Discussion
The case studies illustrate a range of possible health economic
promotional claims and highlight possible interpretations regard-
ing Section 114. However, with the possible exceptions of cases 1
and 2, the strictest interpretation of the section might prohibit
most examples, because the underlying analyses diverge from
“substantial evidence” and potentially contain implied clinical
claims, even if they are remote and even if the analyses under-
lying the promotions meet the CRSE standard. The reason is that
health economic analyses are invariably based on clinical con-
tent. Extrapolations from intermediate end points with “substan-
tial evidence” to long-term end points—even if analysts are
transparent and rely on assumptions based on strong epidemio-
logical evidence—trigger questions about violating Section 114
because they run afoul of the “directly-related to the approved
indication” provision, and about whether they constitute health
economic information.
In other cases, implied clinical claims may be more subtle as in
the use of retrospective database analyses in which patients differ
from those in the product’s RCT or indications. Trial patients meet
strict criteria, whereas “real-world” patients reﬂect the vagaries of
prescriber and patient behavior. Promotions involving retrospec-
tive database analysis could raise questions about whether they
violate the “directly-related to the approved indication” clause.
Retrospective database analyses of adherence could raise ques-
tions—despite adherence’s importance and the fact that it is
difﬁcult to study in trials—because superior adherence might
imply a clinical claim about a drug that is not in the label.
However, one could also argue that, assuming that the CRSE
standard is met, most of the cases would be allowable under a
ﬂexible deﬁnition of the “directly-related” clause. Under this
interpretation, a company could extrapolate to dosages, popula-
tions, and settings as long as there are no off-label claims and
analyses meet the CRSE criterion, which involves, as noted,
conforming to best practices, such as prespecifying end points
and the statistical analysis plan, using suitable statistical
approaches, and conducting adequate sensitivity analyses.The language of Section 114 is sufﬁciently vague that one
might reasonably conclude that many of the case studies fall in a
gray area, leaving legal, regulatory, health economics, and other
teams within drug companies to interpret the statute and gauge
the company’s risk tolerance. The seemingly limited use of
Section 114 to date may reﬂect companies’ uncertainty about
its scope. The dilemma is that payers are interested in knowing
about real-world patients and comparative effectiveness
research. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute
was created to fund and disseminate such information. Drug
companies, however, are hesitant to promote such information,
even under Section 114, which was established to help compa-
nies engage health plans around real-world data to inform
coverage and reimbursement.
The FDA is currently considering draft guidance on Section 114
[16]. To be sure, the agency faces important challenges in inter-
preting the statute and in regulating practices. As we have noted
elsewhere, there remain concerns that allowing drug companies to
promote information about end points that have not been
adequately studied could still mislead intended audiences and
remove incentives for companies to conduct randomized trials [1].
In addition, Section 114 has proven challenging to regulate
and interpret. For example, deﬁnition and evaluation of the CRSE
and relatedness criteria for any given submission are far from
obvious.
At the very least, however, the case studies illustrate the need
for clarity and ﬂexibility. It would be useful if the agency deﬁned
what is meant by “formulary committee or other similar entity”
(e.g., does it include a physician responsible for quality metrics in
an ACO?). Clarity is also needed on what constitutes CRSE, and on
when health economic claims violate the “directly-relate[d]”
clause. The use of extrapolations from surrogate to longer-term
end points within the context of a Section 114 claim is a
particularly important issue that may warrant speciﬁc comment
from the FDA. In our view, it would help if the FDA would permit
ﬂexibility around interpreting language of the statute in the
context of promotions to payers, and a permissive attitude
toward adherence claims and uses of real-world data, as long
as studies are conducted according to best practice methodology
(i.e., standards from Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Insti-
tute [5], ISPOR [4], and the Good Research for Comparative
Effectiveness initiative [3]). Beyond that, as we have argued
elsewhere [1], it would be even more helpful to broaden Section
114 to include clinical comparative effectiveness claims, a step
that may require new legislation.
The case studies developed here have limitations. Most
important, because of space constraints, they lack detail and
context and are simpliﬁcations of reality. Judging whether a
particular analysis reﬂects competent and reliable practices
would require much more elaboration than is possible here. Still,
we believe they illustrate the kinds of issues that drug companies
and the FDA confront. They reveal challenges given the vague
language of Section 114. The spirit of the law was to provide a
protected space for communication between companies and
plans about value. Ideally, such information can help payers
make better formulary decisions and ultimately improve patient
health for the resources expended. This article adds to the debate
around the statute by presenting cases that illustrate the many
potential uses of Section 114, and the section’s potential for
providing an avenue for exchange between drug companies
around health economics and value. The article also shows that
in practice it is difﬁcult to know exactly what the section allows
given the imprecision of the statute and lack of guidance about
its scope. Ideally, clarity and ﬂexibility will be provided in FDA
guidance and/or new legislation.
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